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EXPOSURE TO LOW-DOSE RADIATION AND
THE LEGAL REMEDY
Yi-Chen Su* & Peter W.S. Chang**
In addition to the toll in human life, there are at least three facets
of damage caused by the protracted exposure to low-dose radiation:
bodily injury, mental anguish, and property injury. After examining cases
and compensation schemes in the United States and Taiwan, this article
concludes that both the Taiwanese administrative compensation scheme
and U.S. federal courts' interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act favor
finding injury to the claimants' property, but not adverse effects to their
health. To redress the injustice caused by the systemic bias, this article
argues that the tort system should be adapted to tolerate gray area, such
as the adoption ofthe probability ofcausation. This article further argues
that the probability ofcausation should be applied in calculating damages
in the radiation-exposure context.
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INTRODUCTION

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake, 1 which hit Japan in March
2011 leading to radiation leaking from the Fukushima power plant
site, 2 raised worldwide concern regarding the consequences of
radiation exposure. Radiation leaking or contamination usually has
long term effects, oftentimes much longer than a human life. For
instance, it is estimated that the radioactive materials released in
Fukushima could exist at dangerous levels for up to half a million
years. 3
While high-dose 4 radiation causes agonizing and often fatal
damage to the human body in a matter of days or hours, low-dose
radiation may lead to cancer. 5 Epidemiologists estimated that 6,000
to 7,000 cases of thyroid cancer would not have occurred if it were
not for the Chemobyl explosion in Russia in 1986. 6
Other than the toll in human life, there are at least three facets
of damage caused by the protracted exposure to low-dose radiation:
bodily injury, mental anguish, and property injury. The legal remedy
for each facet should be considered separately.
After examining cases and compensation schemes in the
United States and Taiwan, this article concludes that both the
Taiwanese administrative compensation scheme7 and U.S. federal
' Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Updates Magnitude of Japan's
2011 Tohoku Earthquake to 9.0 (Mar. 14, 2011) available at http://www. usgs.gov/
newsroom/article.asp?ID=2727 &from=rss_home.
2 David Muir, Jessica Hopper & Dean Schabner, Japan Earthquake: Radiation
Leaking after Fukushima Nuclear Plant Explodes, ABC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2011)
http:/I abcnews. go. com/Intemational!j apan-earthquake-radiation -leaking-fuku
shima-nuclear-plant-explodes/story?id=13131123.
3 Jeffrey Kluger, Japans Radiation Exposure: How Serious Is It?, TIME: EcocEN
TRIC BLOG (Mar. 12, 2011) http:/!ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2011/03/12/japans
radiation-exposure-how -serious-is-it/.
4 Dose is concentration multiplied by duration. Bernard D. Goldstein, Toxic Torts:
the Devil is in the Dose, 16 J.L. & PoL'Y 551, 566 (2008).
5 Eben Harrell, Japan Nuclear Emergency: How Much Radiation Is Safe, TIME:
EcocENTRIC BLOG (Mar. 13, 2011) http:/!ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2011/03/13/
japan-nuclear-emergency-how-much-radiation-is-safe/.
6 Kluger, supra note 3.
7 Article 10 of the State Compensation Law requires each victim to initiate a
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courts' interpretation ofthe Price-AndersonAct8 favor finding injury
to the claimants' property, but not adverse effects to their health.
Residents without property ownership, such as the lessee or the poor,
are virtually remediless. The social injustice caused by systemic bias
should be redressed. Part I of this article examines early milestone
cases dealing with damage caused by low-dose radiation exposure
in the United States and Taiwan respectively, and their effect on
later cases or legislation. Part II briefly explores two compensation
schemes in the United States, namely the Radiation Exposure
Compensation Program9 and the Energy Employees Occupational
Illness Compensation Program, 10 in contrast to the federal courts'
view of causation and the interpretation of bodily injury under the
Price-Anderson Act in recent cases. Part III examines a Taiwanese
court's reasoning in granting plaintiffs damages for mental anguish,
as opposed to U.S. federal courts' reluctance in granting damages
even if the defendants had engaged in deception or concealment
concerning the danger of the work environment. This Part also
highlights the anomaly under the Price-Anderson Act that a plaintiff
has to separate her fear of the radioactivity from the non-radioactive
part of the same material to which the plaintiff was exposed to be
eligible for damages. Part IV examines the Taiwanese compensation
scheme redressing property injury and U.S. federal courts' reasoning
regarding the interpretation of damage to property and loss of use of
property under the Price-Anderson Act.
negotiation process with the government authorities concerned for a possible
agreement on compensation before going to court. Law of the People's Republic
of China on State Compensation, art. 10 (1980) (Taiwan) [hereinafter State Com
pensation Law], available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1163
(amended) (original passed in 1980, not amended available at http://www.virtual
asia.com/taiwan!bizpack/legalcodes/state_compensation.htm).
8 U.S. Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210, in 1957. The
Act authorizes the government making "funds available for a portion of the dam
ages suffered by the public from nuclear incidents" and limiting "the liability
of those persons liable for such loses" to serves dual purpose of protecting the
public and encouraging the development of the atomic energy industry. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2012(i) (2011); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 65 (1978).
9 Infra note 124.
10 Infra note 170.
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It is not the purpose of this article to argue whether an
agency adjudication scheme is superior to the courts, or vice versa,
in the radiation-exposure context. Rather, the article argues that
the tort system should be adapted to tolerate gray area, such as the
adoption of the probability of causation. 11 Currently, the probability
of causation is employed under certain compensation schemes in
inferring causallinlc This article further argues that the probability of
causation should be applied in calculating damages in the radiation
exposure context as well.

I.

THE TORTS

It is difficult, ifnot impossible, to set a safe dose for radiation
exposure. 12 Consequently, the difficulty in setting a threshold leads
to the difficulty in establishing the standard of care, as well as
negligence, in torts.
Though earlier cases seemingly have agreed that dose limits
under federal regulations set the sole standard of care, 13 recent cases
suggest that the issue is far from settled. For instance, in Dumontier
v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 14 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit opined that accepting federal dose limits as the standard of
care would make a discharge or dispersal exceeding the limits in
federal regulations a strict liability offence. 15 It is evident under 10
C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(l) that exceeding such regulations, "although [a]
possible cause for concern, is not one which would be expected to
cause substantial injury or damage." 16 Similarly, the court in Cookv.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 17 also an American case, was struggling with

"Irifranote 114.
12 Harrell, supra note 5; see also 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(1) (2011).
13 See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199
F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000); Roberts v. Florida Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305,
1308 (11th Cir. 1998); O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090,
1105 (7th Cir. 1994).
14 543 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2008).
15 Id at 571.
16 10 C.F.R. § 140.81 (b )(1) (20 11 ).
17 618 F.3d 1127 (lOth Cir. 2010).
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the various regulations and documents proffered by the defendants. 18
Eventually, the court concluded that the defendants failed to establish
the minimal level ofradiation exposure at which such contamination
becomes unreasonable. 19 The court interpreted relevant regulations,
state or federal, as akin to zoning statutes- merely indicating special
care must be taken, rather than setting a minimal level at which such
contamination becomes unreasonable. 20
Indeed, studies have suggested that an individual's risk of
cancer is increased even by exposure to low-dose radiation. 21 Before
the Second World War, it was believed no demonstrable harm could
be measured by exposure to radiation below a tolerance dose. 22 After
the war, the concept of a threshold was gradually abandoned in light
ofthe effects seen in the atomic bomb survivors in Japan. 23
Radiation contamination is the unpleasant consequence of
utilizing radioactive materials in various sectors, such as generating
electricity or assisting medical imaging or diagnosis. Litigation
for damage caused by the contamination follow suit. Among those
cases, Wang Yu-Lin v. AEC24 and In re TMI Litigation25 are the
milestone cases concerning low-dose radiation exposure in Taiwan
and the United States respectively.
The Taiwanese case, Wang Yu-Lin, 26 was chosen to elaborate
the issues of establishing duty of care, negligence, and causation
in a radiation-contamination context. The Taiwanese court sought
!d. at 1147.
!d.
20 !d.
21 Per Hall, Cancer Risks after Exposure to Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation
Contribution and Lessons Learnt from Epidemiology, 2001 EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY
22, available at http://ec.europa.eu!energy/nuclear/radiation_protection/doc/pub
lication/125.pdf.
22 !d.
23 !d. It has been shown that the risk of cancer is increased even at doses below
100 mSv. !d. at 30.
24 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 (Civ. Judgment of
Taiwan App. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
25 In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.
2000).
26 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 (Civ. Judgment of Taiwan App. Ct., Jan. 30,
2002).
18
19
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to answer the unsettled question whether statistics and laboratory
data, such as the increased incidences of various cancers and the
increased frequencies of chromosomal aberration, 27 in the absence
of manifestation of physically detectable diseases, were sufficient to
establish physical damage in torts. 28 If not, the question is whether
the statistics and laboratory data suggesting adverse effects from
radiation exposure to human bodies, in the absence of manifestation
of diseases, were sufficient to establish a causal link from such
radiation exposure to individuals' mental anguish. 29
By comparison, the American case, In re TMI Litigation, 30
demonstrates the extent of complexity and difficulty for plaintiffs
to establish negligence and causation by estimating the radiation
doses to which they were exposedY More importantly, even if the
plaintiffs had developed illnesses, their case still failed because
it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude the possibility that the
illnesses may have been induced by causes other than their exposure
to radiation. 32
A. Wang Yu-Lin v. AEC
Since the issuance ofthe Taiwanese appellate court's decision
in 2002 sustaining state compensation to citizens with prolonged
excessive radiation exposure from 6°Co contaminated steels, 33 the
spread of radioactive steel remains a worldwide concern. In recent
years, large quantities of 6°Co contaminated steel were found or
intercepted in several countries. 34 Some have caused significant
27 Chromosomal aberration, which is a result of DNA damaged by irradiation, can
be measured quantitatively as a function of absorbed dose. In re TMI Litig., 193
F.3d at 640.
28 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 (Civ. Judgment of
Taiwan App. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
29 Id.
30 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).
31 Id. at 666-716.
32 Id. at 643--48.
33 6°Co is a radioactive isotope of Cobalt.
34 See, e.g., Christian Schwager!, Finds ofRadioactive Steel on the Rise in Ger
many, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 16, 2009) http://www.spiegel.de/
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damage. 35
In March 1985, radiation safety surveillance was conducted
for a newly installed X-ray machine at a dental clinic located in
a newly-constructed apartment building called Ming-Sheng Villa. 36
The inspector was surprised that very high gamma-radioactivity was
detected even ifthe X-ray machine was not plugged in. 37
The inspector submitted a report of his findings to the
Taiwanese AEC, which is the governmental nuclear regulatory
agency in Taiwan. 38 After receiving the report, the Taiwanese AEC
dispatched two specialists to the dental clinic and the store next to
the clinic for extensive investigation. 39 Radiation levels ranging
from 0.5 to 120 ~Sv per hour were observed. 40 The radiation
protection specialists reported the results of their investigation and
proposed remedial measures to the then Director of the Department
of Radiation Protection of the AEC. 41 For unknown reasons, both
the Director and the then Secretary General of AEC decided to
classify the reports and took no further action. As a result, neither
the residents living in the Ming-Sheng Villa nor the general public
was informed of the radioactive contamination. 42

intemational/world/0,1518,607840,00.html; IANS, Germany Probes Radioac
tive Steel Exported by India, SILICONINDIA NEWS (Feb. 15, 2009) http://www.sili
conindia. com/shownews/Germany_probes_radioactive_steel_exported_by_In
dia-nid-52533.html; Prabir Purkayastha, Hot Steel and a Cold Govt: Mayapuri
Radioactive Exposure, INDIA CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 201 0) http://indiacur
rentaffairs.org!hot-steel-and-a-cold-govt-mayapuri-radioactive-exposure-prabir
purkayastha!.
35 Prabir Purkayastha, Hot Steel and a Cold Govt: Mayapuri Radioactive Expo
sure, INDIA CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 2010) http://indiacurrentaffairs.org/hot
steel-and-a-cold-govt-mayapuri-radioactive-exposure-prabir-purkayastha!.
36 Jau-Yuan Hwang, Joseph B.H. Chang, & Wushou P. Chang, Spread of 6°Co
Contaminated Steel and Its Legal Consequences in Taiwan, 81 HEALTH PHYSICS
655, 655 (2001).

Id.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. 1 mSv equals 1000 f!Sv.
41 Id at 655.
42 Id. at 655-56.
37
38
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It was not until approximately seven years after the first
official report was sent to the Taiwanese AEC, in August 1992, that
the radioactive contamination at the Ming-Sheng Villa building was
disclosed to the general public by a local newspaper. 43 The residents
of the Ming-Sheng Villa learned from the media that, unbeknownst
to them, they had stayed for years in apartments with excessive
radiation levels. 44
The residents filed a petition for state compensation against
the Taiwanese AEC in May 1994. 45 The Taiwanese AEC denied
the petition a few days later. 46 As a result, a total of 57 residents of
the Ming-Sheng Villa brought a collective civil action against the
Taiwanese AEC before the Taipei district courtY The district court
handed down a judgment partially in favor of the exposed residents
in October 1997, and both the residents and the AEC appealed. 48
It is worth noting that it was not until May 1994, almost
nine years after the first official report regarding the radiation
contamination at Ming-Sheng Villa, that the Taiwanese AEC
issued the Regulations for Prevention and Handling of Radiation
Contaminated Buildings. 49 The regulations were the first written rule
specifically governing radiation contaminated construction materials
and buildings in Taiwan. 50 Therefore, there was no statutory text at
the time ofthe incident prescribing AEC's dutyY
The appellate court, which is the trial of second instance
in Taiwan, handed down its decision in January 2002. 52 The court
based its finding of governmental duty on the Council of Grand
!d. at 656.
See Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 16-17 (Civ.
Judgment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
45 Hwang, Change, & Chang supra note 36, at 656.
46 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 41 (Civ. Judg
ment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
47 Hwang, Chang, & Chang supra note 36, at 656.
48 !d.
49 !d.
50 !d.
51 !d.
52 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 87 (Civ. Judg
ment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
43

44
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Justices' prior interpretation of law. 53 Specifically, the Council of
Grand Justices instructed that "whether a governmental agency has
the duty to act is dependent on the purposes ofthe statute rather than
the text of the statute." 54
The second paragraph ofArticle 2 ofthe State Compensation
Law55 ("SCL") provides that if any national's freedoms or rights are
infringed as a result of failure of any civil servant in the fulfillment
of his or her duty, such national is entitled to damage compensation
against the government department to which the civil servant
belongs. 56
In this case, the Taiwanese appellate court concluded that the
AEC owed the residents a duty of care. 57 Based on the Council of
53 Council of Grand Justices' Opinion No. 469 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Taiwan). The
Council of Grand Justices consists offifteen members nominated by the President.
The Council is charged with interpreting the Constitution.
54 Council of Grand Justices' Opinion No. 469 (Nov. 20, 1998) (Taiwan). The
Council of Grand Justices' interpretation concerning the government's duty un
der Article 2 of the State Compensation Law stated that if the purposes of an
enacted law are not limited to the prescription of government's authority in pro
moting public affairs, but instead protect the life, human health, property and
other interests of the citizen, the victim of public authorities' action may seek
compensatory damages. Id In particular, if specific provisions are stipulated
therein with respect to matters which are executed by the responsible authorities
in the exercise of their public authorities, pursuant to which the public servant of
a responsible authority has no discretionary power for inaction with respect to any
obligations to identifiable persons, and the failure to discharge his or her duties by
reason of deliberateness or negligence has resulted in harm to the liberty or rights
of the identifiable persons, the victim of such failure may claim compensatory
damages in accordance with Article 2, the latter part of Paragraph 2, of the State
Compensation Law. !d.
55 State Compensation Law, art. 2 (1980) (Taiwan), available at http://
en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1163 (amended) (http://www. virtual-asia.
com/taiwan!bizpack/legalcodes/state_ compensation.htm, not amended: original
passed in 1980).
56 !d.
57 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 49 (Civ. Judg
ment of Taiwan App. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002). The Appellate Court opined that the
AEC's duty to act included the examination ofbuildings suspected of using radio
active steel and other related materials from the same or similar sources; inform
ing the residents in the Ming-Sheng Villa ofthe radioactivity levels detected in the
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Grand Justices' interpretation, the appellate court reasoned that the
government's duty exists when there is an imminent emergency even
if the statute did not clearly specify the government's obligation. 58
Specifically, even if civil servants have discretion in determining
whether to act or how to act, when a national's life, body, or health
is facing imminent danger, the administrative agency's discretion
should be reduced to zero in the face of emergency. 59
Moreover, the Taiwanese Control Yuan's60 issuance of
corrections against the Taiwanese AEC and its officials for the
agency's nonfeasance may have paved the way for the Taiwanese
court's finding of AEC's negligence, 61 and thereby for the court to
hold in favor of the exposed residents on policy grounds. The first
correction againstAEC officials led to the initiation ofthe lawsuit at
issue, 62 and the second correction issued approximately half a year
before the appellate court's decision specifically pointed out that the
AEC's nonfeasance had caused the exposed residents to suffer long
term mental anguish. 63
areas they lived; and controlling or the putting up alarms over the areas in which
the radioactivity levels detected might have exceeded safety standards. However,
the court acknowledged that the Taiwanese AEC did not have the direct duty or
legal empowerment to confine and to prevent radioactive steel entering into the
market, which is a duty comparable to the governmental agency's obligation to
prevent unsafe drugs or food entering into the market. !d.
58 !d.
59 !d.
60 The Control Yuan is one of the branches of the central government in Taiwan. It
is an investigatory agency monitoring the other branches of the government. The
Republic of China (Taiwan) The Control Yaun, GoVERNMENT ENTRY PoiNT, http://
www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xltem=25513&ctNode= 1957&mp=999 (last updated
Apr 9, 2012).
61 See Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-l at 49 (Civ.
Judgment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
62 !d. In September 1993, the Control Yuan impeached three AEC officials in their
personal capacity after investigation for their failure to report their findings to
their superiors concerning the unusual radiation inside the wall of the building
as well as the source of the contaminated steel. AEC officials impeached include
the former Director of the Department of Radiation Protection and the former
Secretary General; both had been involved in the decision to conceal the report
mentioned in the above and took no actions in 1985. !d.
63 !d. In May 200 1, the Control Yuan issued another correction against the
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The appellate court in Taiwan found that the causation
between AEC 's negligence and the suffering ofthe exposed residents
exists based on an American legal concept, "reasonable medical
certainty," 64 even though the definition of "reasonable medical
certainty" in American case law is far from certain. 65 The court's
Taiwanese AEC and the Department of Health on several grounds. First, the in
consistency of radiation exposure threshold for residents' mandatory health ex
amination formulated by the AEC between Taipei city and other counties failed to
meet international standards and had caused injustice. Second, the AEC's failure
to provide residents with radiation safety education and necessary health consul
tation had caused residents economic losses and long-term mental anguish. Third,
more than 150,000 buildings suspected of radiation contamination were yet to be
examined, indicating the AEC's failure in the execution of radiation protection.
Fourth, the Department of Health failed to follow the results of the residents'
health examination for years and did not provide the residents with necessary
medical assistances. Id.
64 The phrase "with a reasonable degree ofmedical certainty" in American case law
can be traced to Chicago, Illinois, sometime during the years from 1915 to 1930.
Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution ofLegal Uncertainty About "Reason
able Medical Certainty", 57 MD. L. REv. 380, 381 (1998). The standard of rea
sonable medical certainty was adopted "in law to assure that testimony received
by the fact finder was not merely conjectural but rather was sufficiently probative
to be reliable" because of the observation that "[l]ittle, if anything, is 'certain' in
science." Dallas v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 689 P.2d 273, 277 (Mont. 1984).
The requirement of reasonable medical certainty is applicable only when an ex
pert is expressing an expert medical opinion about causation or future damages, or
other issues related to possibility or probability. Holmes v. Gamewell, 712 S.W.2d
34, 37 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986); Wagner v. Piehler, 879 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App. W.D.
1994). In practice, reasonable medical certainty is the standard for medical testi
mony involving judgment as to causation and future damages. As a general rule,
a statement of medical opinion must be one of "reasonable medical certainty"
to support a finding of a causal relationship between an accident and an injury.
Carter v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Mo. App. S.D.1997).
65 1t has long been criticized that the cases on reasonable medical certainty reflect a
lack of clarity. Wollen v. DePaul Health Center, 828 S.W.2d 681,682 (Mo. 1992).
Though case law does not provide a definition, the how-to books for medical
experts do. "The phrase 'reasonable medical certainty' means 'more likely than
not.' In other words, if there is preponderance- [fifty-one percent] or more- of
evidence in one direction, then the phrase 'reasonable medical certainty is appli
cable."' WILLIAM T. TsUHIMA & KENNETH K. NAKANo, EFFECTIVE MEmcAL TESTIFY
ING -A HANDBOOK FOR PHYSICIANS 5 ( 1998). Nevertheless, since the early 1980s,
the requirement of "reasonable medical certainty" has been gradually replaced
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finding of causation may be deemed a policy consideration.
The appellate court acknowledged that it is very difficult to
establish factual causation by methods developed in natural science,
such as the observance of increased rate of cancer occurrence
after years of radiation overexposure. 66 It is impossible to request
ordinary people without scientific knowledge or training to proffer
evidence on the issue of causation in cases like this. 67 Therefore, in
cases concerning public harm, the burden of proof on the issue of
causation required in traditional torts should be relaxed. 68 The court
opined that as long as the probabilities ofthe residents' contracting
diseases increased due to the AEC's conduct, the requirement under
the concept of "reasonable medical certainty" has been met. 69 It is
not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that AEC's conduct caused
their actual damage. 70

with the "probabilities" of causal relationships because of the former's ambiguity
and lack of clarity. See Lane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 308 N.W.2d 503,
512-13 (Neb. 1981). However, a mere possibility does not qualify for admission
into evidence nor does it make the expert testimony substantial evidence support
ing a verdict or judgment of the court.
66 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 75 (Civ. Judg
ment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
67 !d.
68 !d.
69 !d.
70 !d. Indeed, later studies showed that, in the case in Taiwan, the residents' cancer
risks were demonstrated. The study conducted by Hwang et al. indicated that
cancer occurrences exhibited significant exposure-dependent increased risks in
individuals with the initial exposure before the age of thirty, but not beyond this
age. S.L. Hwang et al., Cancer Risks in a Population with Prolonged Low Dose
Rate Gamma-Radiation Exposure in Radiocontaminated Buildings 1983-2002,
82 INT'L. J. RADIATION BIOLOGY 849, 849-58 (2006). Another study conducted
by Hwang et al. further strengthened the association between protracted low
dose radiation and cancer risks, especially for breast cancers and leukemia, in
this unique affected population. S.L. Hwang, J.S. Hwang, Y.T. Yang, W.A. Hsieh,
T.C. Chang, H.R. Guo, M.H. Tsai, J.L. Tang, I.F. Lin & W.P. Chang, Estimates
of Relative Risks for Cancers in a Population after Prolonged Low-Dose-Rate
Exposure: a Follow-Up Assessment from 1983 to 2005, 170 RADIATION REs. 43,
143--48 (2008).
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The court further reasoned that the Taiwanese AEC
could have foreseen that the residents' health be affected by their
exposure to the radioactive steel, and therefore causation exists. 71
The Taiwanese AEC knew since 1985 both that the building was
contaminated with radioactive steel and the source of the steel,
but neglected to inform the residents. 72 AEC's inaction caused the
residents exposure to radioactive materials for a prolonged period of
time. 73 Therefore, the court concluded that this should be sufficient
to find causation in this case, and stated that to find otherwise would
cause injustice. 74
The Taiwanese court created an exception, lowering the
bar of causation for this particular case, arguably based on policy
considerations. On the other hand, unlike the Taiwanese court in
Wang Yu-Lin, the American court in In re TMI Litigation refused to
relax the standard of causation in the radiation-exposure context.

B. In re TMI Litigation
The radiation leak at Three Mile Island more than thirty years
ago was described as "the worst nuclear accident" in the United

71 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 76 (Civ. Judg
ment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
72 !d.
73 !d.
74 !d. In 2004, a group of residents in Taipei County sued the Taiwanese AEC on
the same grounds as the residents in the Ming-Sheng Villa case. Yang Feng-Ming
v. AEC, 2005 94-chong-shang-kuo-tze-4 at 7 (Civ. Judgment ofTaiwanApp. Ct.,
Aug. 31, 2005). On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that the statute of limi
tation had elapsed since the residents first knew of the radioactive contamination.
Id The court reasoned that, in this case, the Taiwanese AEC learned of the ra
dioactive contamination in October 1996 and promptly informed the residents.
Id The residents applied for compensations and the compensations were granted
pursuant to the Regulations for Prevention and Handling of Radiation Contami
nated Buildings which was issued in 1994 after the Ming-Sheng Villa incident.
The residents in this case did not initiate a lawsuit until April2004. Id It was more
than eight years since they learned of the radioactive contamination. Id The stat
ute of limitations is two years from the time the plaintiffs learn of the tortfeasors
who committed the tort. Id
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States. 75 Radioactive materials were released into the environment,
including a river nearby. 76 It took operations personnel almost one
month to regain control and reestablish stable conditions after the
accident. 77 Litigations claiming personal injury continued for almost
twenty years and those cases were eventually consolidated in one
federal court.7 8 These cases showcase the tort system's helplessness,
rather than unpreparedness, in dealing with new challenges
accompanied with the advances of science and technology.
Following the accident, more than 2,000 plaintiffs filed
claims alleging that they had developed neoplasms 79 caused by
exposure to the radioactive materials released into the environment
as a result ofthe nuclear reactor accident on March 28, 1979. 80 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor ofthe defendants,
including the owners and operators of the nuclear facility, and held
that the plaintiffs81 were unable to connect their neoplasms, either
directly or indirectly, to the accident. 82 The parties appealed. 83
The Third Circuit Court ofAppeals previously had held that,
for plaintiffs to prevail in claims alleging injuries caused by radiation
exposure, they must establish: first, the defendants released radiation
into the environment exceeding the doses permitted by the federal

In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 655-56 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199 F.3d 158
(3d Cir. 2000).
76 !d. at 658.
77 !d. at 657.
78 !d. at 625.
79 !d. at 622. Neoplasm is defined as "an abnormal tissue that grows by cellular
proliferation more rapidly than normal and continues to grow after the stimuli that
initiated the new growth cease." Neoplasms may be either benign or malignant.
Id. at 623 n. 2.
80 !d. at 622-24.
81 /d. at 627. The trial plaintiffs are a group often plaintiffs selected by the parties to
participate in a "mini trial" of the claims. They are also called "typical" plaintiffs.
Id at 622. The neoplasms they suffered including acute lymphocytic leukemia,
chronic myelogenous leukemia, thyroid cancer, Hurthle cell carcinoma, thyroid
adenoma, osteogenic carcinoma, breast cancer, adenocarcinoma of the ovaries,
bladder cancer, and acoustic neuroma. !d. at 623, 627 n. 15.
82 !d. at 623, 628.
83 !d. at 628.
75
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regulations in effect at the time ofthe incident; 84 second, the plaintiffs
were exposed to the radiation, though it is not a requirement that
the doses to which they were exposed were in excess of the levels
permitted by the federal regulations; 85 third, the plaintiffs suffered
injuries; 86 and fourth, the radiation was the cause of the injuries. 87
Here, in In re TMI Litigation, the plaintiffs were unable to proffer
reliable dose estimates of the radiation to which they were exposed
even with the aid of experts. 88
On appeal, as the court framed it, the critical issue in this
case is whether the trial plaintiffs have the ability to "demonstrate
that they were exposed to doses of radiation sufficient to cause their
neoplasms." 89 Indeed, the court of appeals agreed with the district
court's findings in general that, though the majority ofthe plaintiffs'
expert witnesses were well-qualified, many of the methodologies
and data their opinions were based on are those that "a reasonable
expert in the field would not rely upon." 90 As a consequence, the
majority of the expert testimonies proffered by the plaintiffs were
excluded, and the remaining were insufficient to create a material
issue of fact to survive the summary judgment. 91
However, the court acknowledged that low-dose radiation
may cause lethal damage by injuring DNA, even ifnot all irradiation
caused damage to DNA is harmful. 92 It is also believed that the
probability of causing such lethal damage, rather than the severity,
is determined by dose. 93 In other words, the probability of radiation
exposure leading to cancer is proportional to the dose absorbed. 94
The court further acknowledged that medical examinations
and laboratory tests cannot prove or disprove "that a specific
In re TMI Litig., 67 F.3d 1103, 1119 (3d Cir. 1995).
!d.
86 !d.
87 !d.
88 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 627.
89 !d. at 622-23.
90 See id. at 627, 666-716.
91 !d. at 717.
92 !d. at 640, 642.
93 !d. at 640, 642.
94 !d. at 642.
84

85
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malignancy was caused by a specific radiation exposure."95 The
inquiry into cause is further complicated by the fact that radiation is
not known to leave a marker in cells that later become malignant, 96
and that mankind has been exposed to natural radiation since our
first appearance on the planet. 97 Therefore, even if the plaintiff can
prove that her cancer was caused by radiation, 98 she may not be
able to exclude the possibility that the cancer was induced by other
causes, such as the natural radiation or other background radiation. 99
Seemingly the only way to establish causation, as the court
has suggested, though it was not sure, is probably by conducting
epidemiological studies of populations exposed to radiation. 100
Consequently, though not presented in In re TMI Litigation, another
issue arising from the admissibility of evidence in similar cases
is under what circumstances epidemiological studies can be used
to establish causation between the radiation exposure and the
injury. 101 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently suggested,
epidemiological studies can be used only if: first, the studies are
scientifically reliable and show a substantially elevated risk; second,
the plaintiff is similar to those in the studies; and third, the plaintiff
must offer evidence excluding other plausible causes of the injury
or condition with reasonable certainty. 102 The instruction, which was
originally devised by the Texas Supreme Court, 103 is not helpful
because the plaintiff would eventually fail on the third element for
not being able to exclude other possible causes.
As exemplified in In re TMI Litigation, plaintiffs in a lawsuit
relating to nuclear accidents oftentimes cannot describe how the
incident occurred because of the complexity of nuclear science
!d. at 643.
!d.
97 !d.
98 The court suggested that translocations, or stable chromosome aberration, can
be reliably used as markers for estimating dose exposure. !d. at 690-91.
99 !d. at 643--44.
100 !d. at 643.
101 Cotroneo v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., 2011 639 F.3d 186, 192-93 (5th
Cir. 2011).
102Jd
103 Id
95

96
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and engineering involved. 104 In some ways, this complexity could
affect the establishment of the defendants' duty of care. Even if the
parties are able to establish the duty of care, it is difficult to estimate
the radiation doses to which the plaintiffs were exposed because
of the existence of numerous unsettled competing theories and
models in the field. 105 Consequently, epidemiological studies based
on the estimates of radiation doses cannot be admitted to prove
causation. 106 As the court in In re TMI Litigation has stated, it "is
somewhat analogous to the last domino in the line that begins to fall
when the first domino is toppled." 107
In particular, dose reconstructions 108 are more complex when
the claimants experienced more diverse exposures and circumstances
of exposure, either on an individual basis or as a group, 109 as seen
in some radiation-exposure class litigations. no It further adds to the
complexity and difficulty in estimating radiation doses if there is
potential for internal doses, as opposed to external doses, m through
the ingestion, inhalation or absorption of radioactive materials. 112
104 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 655. The court's description of the TMI
accident was exclusively taken from the defense exhibits. The plaintiffs did not
offer any explanation of how the accident occurred. Id.
105 See id. at 659-62, 667-95.
106 See id. at 704-06.
107 Id. at 715.
108 Dose reconstruction refers to research and analysis leading to a quantitative
estimate of radiation exposure, particularly when radiation monitoring data are
unavailable, incomplete, or unreliable. NAT'L INST. FOR OccUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, UsER's GUIDE FOR THE INTERACTIVE RADioEPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROGRAM 16
(2009).
109 See Guidelines for Determining Probability of Causation Under the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, 67 Fed.
Reg. 22,296 (May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 81).
" 0 See e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.
2002); In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).
m External dose is referring to the dose from radiation sources located outside the
body. NAT'L INST. FOR OccUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 108, at 16.
" 2 See Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of2000, 42 USC§ 7384 (2010);
see also Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, 67 Fed. Reg. at 22,314
(May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 CFR Pt. 82).
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The extensive involvement of science and technology in In re TMI
Litigation can be demonstrated by the court's unusually long opin
ion, which dedicated approximately thirty pages to explaining the
background knowledge of nuclear science and technology. 113 There
fore, the right question to ask in cases like this is, assuming that
the plaintiff's illness was actually caused by the radiation, whether
a reasonable plaintiff has the capacity to establish the causal link.
Alternatively, should public policy allow holding victims to a high
burden of proof under which virtually no reasonable plaintiff could
prevail?
Perhaps with this question in mind, the court in In re TMI
Litigation did point out the possibility of moving away from the
demand of rigid causation toward a "probability of causation"
approach in determining the probability that a particular malignancy
may have been caused by the plaintiff's exposure to the particular
radiation. 114 Later, in Kennedy v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 115 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals opined that, whether the calculation of
the probability of causation is per se unreliable is not the point. 116
The point, as the court in In re TMI Litigation asked but could not
resolve, is whether the plaintiff has the ability to demonstrate that
the deceased was exposed to doses of radiation sufficient to cause
her illness." 117
In essence, courts in these cases were conducting circular
reasoning. A court suggested that epidemiological studies should be
helpful in establishing causation, 118 and then another court instructed
that epidemiological studies cannot be admitted unless the plaintiffs
can exclude other possible causes. 119 One court suggested that the
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 629-58.
!d. at 727. A "probability of causation" ("PC") approach determines the
probability, as opposed to absolute proof, that a particular malignancy may have
been caused by exposure to ionizing radiation. "Although the radiation dose to the
individual is a variable in the PC equation, there is no specific dose required to
make the equation workable." !d.
115 268 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2001 ).
116 !d. at 771.
117 See id.; see also In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 622-23.
118 In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 643.
119 Cotroneo v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., 2011 F.3d 186, 193 (5th Cir.
113

114
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probability of causation may help when plaintiffs cannot reliably
estimate radiation doses, 120 and then the other court commented that
the probability of causation needs not be considered if the plaintiffs
cannot reliably estimate whether the radiation dose is sufficient to
cause the illness. 121
Though the Taiwanese court in Wang Yu-Lin found that
causation exists and acknowledged that the plaintiffs' health was
affected, the court was reluctant to grant plaintiffs damages for the
injury to their health. In the radiation-exposure context, however,
the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals has asserted the plaintiffs' needs
for immediate medical monitoring, 122 and epidemiological studies
might be frustrated by lengthy appeals even if the plaintiffs prevail
at trial. 123 Because of the difficulty in setting the standard of care,
finding negligence, and proving causation, agency adjudication
schemes began to develop through legislation.

II.

REMEDY FOR BODILY INJURY

Creating an agency adjudication system to remedy the
claimants' injury to health caused by low-dose radiation exposure
not only reduces the claimants' burden of proof, but allows the
government to incorporate its policy considerations into the
compensation system. The Radiation Exposure Compensation
Program124 ("RECP") in the United States is an example.
2011).
120 In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 727.
121 Kennedy v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 268 F.3d at 771.
122 The medical monitoring claim seeks to compensate for the costs of periodic
testing to detect disease onset. Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts:
Dismantling the Risk-lrifury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1671, 1679 n. 18 (2007).
123 Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1554 (6th Cir. 1997).
124 Dep't of Justice, Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), http://www.
justice.gov/civil/common/reca.html (last visited June 28, 2011). U.S. Congress
passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) on October 5, 1990
and later broadened the scope of the Act's coverage on July 10, 2000 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210 (2006). The RECA provides that the Attorney General be responsible for
processing and adjudicating claims under the Act. The Department of Justice
established the Radiation Exposure Compensation Program ("RECP"), which is
administered by its Civil Division's Torts Branch. !d.. See also Letter from Ste-
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The RECP is an example of an administrative adjudication
scheme triggered by failed class action. Many people filed class action
lawsuits alleging exposure to radiation hazards after the cessation
of the government's aboveground atomic weapons tests from 1945
to 1962, 125 as well as underground uranium-mining operations and
related activities. 126 The lawsuits were eventually dismissed by the
appellate courts and Congress stepped in to devise a program to
make partial restitution to individuals who have developed serious
illness after exposure to the radiation. 127
The program recognizes that the money paid is partial
restitution, which does not completely compensate for the burdens
placed upon the individuals, 128 and the program was designed as
an expedient, low-cost alternative to litigation. 129 Unlike litigation,
the RECP does not require claimants to establish causation, as do
the courts. 130 Instead, a claimant qualifies for the compensation
by establishing the diagnosis of a listed disease after working or
residing in a designated location for a specific period oftime. 131
phen L. Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues to The Hon
orable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman & The Honorable Arlen Specter, Ranking
Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, The Honorable John Conyers,
Jr., Chairman, The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, Comm. on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives (Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Radiation Expo
sure Letter], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07l037r.pdf (relating to
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act: Program Status).
125 Radiation Exposure Letter, supra note 124.
126 !d.
127 Dep't of Justice, Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), http://www.
justice.gov/civil/common/reca.html (last visited June 28, 2011 ).
128 Radiation Exposure Letter, supra note 124, at 1 n. 1.
129 Dep't of Justice, supra note 127. As of fiscal year 2006, the average claim-pro
cessing time was less than one year. Radiation Exposure Letter, supra note 124,
at 3. Nevertheless, the expedient low-cost alternative to litigation was not created
at the expense of precision and fairness. The program allows claimants being
rejected for compensation tore-file their claims with RECP after obtaining new
evidence to correct the deficiency that led to the rejection. !d. at 8. Specifically, in
about forty percent of the claims rejected, claimants re-filed their claims at least
once. !d. Because the convenience of re-filing their claims, very few claimants
would seek judicial review. !d.
130 Dep 't of Justice, supra note 127.
131 !d.
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The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act132 ("RECA"),
which is the statutory authority for RECP, has been amended
several times. 133 The RECA Amendments of 2000, among other
things, added compensable diseases and expanded both the time
periods and geographic areas covered under the program, allowing
more individuals to be eligible for the compensation. 134 Since the
program began processing claims in April 1992, 135 as of June 2007
approximately two-thirds of claims filed were granted. 136 Claimants
residing downwind of the weapon test sites received almost half of
the payments. 137
The policy consideration behind RECP is evident. The
program has expanded its coverage even though the decision was not
supported by critical medical evidence. 138 The RECA Amendments
of 2002 eliminated the requirement for uranium workers diagnosed
with lung cancer to submit certain medical evidence to redress the
unintended effect of excluding many lung cancer claimants from
eligibility for compensation under the program. 139 Before the
amendment, the Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry
had concluded that lung cancer and some other cancers in many
uranium miners are not caused by uranium radiation because the
miners smoked cigarettes and were exposed to other substances also
known to cause cancer. 140
Unfortunately, the eligibility for restitution under the
RECP is limited. Responding to the lawsuits filed in federal and
state courts following the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2011).
Radiation Exposure Letter, supra note 124, at 2.
134 !d.
135 !d. at 1.
136 !d. at 3. The program had received more than 26,000 claims. !d. Among them,
over 18,000 claims were approved and more than 24,000 claimants were compen
sated. !d. at 7.
137 !d. at 8.
138 !d. at 2.
139 !d.
140 Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, Public Health State
ment for Uranium, CDC (Sept. 2011) http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/phs/phs.
asp?id=438&tid=77.
132
133
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in 1979, Congress added section 2014(hh) to the Price-Anderson
Act141 ("PAA") providing the federal courts with original and
removal jurisdiction for any "public liability action" 142 resulting
from "a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation," 143 except for
certain claims covered by workers' compensation, claims incurred
in wartime, or claims involving the licensed property where the
nuclear incident occurs. 144 Under the PAA, "nuclear incident" was
defined as any occurrence causing "bodily injury, sickness, disease,
or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property,
arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or
other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material." 145 Courts have interpreted "bodily injury" as one of the
threshold requirements to be satisfied before seeking damages under
the Act. 146
Approximately ten years after In re TMI Litigation, and
approximately seventeen years after RECP began processing claims,
specific causation continued to haunt the courts and bar plaintiffs
from seeking damages for their personal injury. In June v. Union
Carbide Corp., 147 the Tenth Circuit Court ofAppeals suggested that
the plaintiffs might have produced evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact if they timely argued that they had produced
evidence ofbut-for causation, 148 instead of urging the court to adopt
a substantial-factor test. 149 However, the court acknowledged that
141 The Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
142 "Public liability action" is defined as "any suit asserting public liability." 42
U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2011). "Public liability" is defined as "any legal liability aris
ing out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation." 42
U.S.C. § 2104(w) (2011).
143 El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473,477 (1999).
144 42 U.S.C. § 2104(w) (2011).
145 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (q) (2011).
146 See, e.g., Phillips v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 534 F.3d 986, 1010 (9th
Cir. 2008); June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1248 (lOth Cir. 2009).
147 577 F.3d at 1234.
148 Id at 1246--47. The court suggested that the plaintiffs can prevail if they
produce evidence that radiation was a necessary component of a causal set that
probably would have caused the Plaintiffs' ailments. !d. at 1247.
149 !d. at 1239. The plaintiffs argued that, under the substantial-factor test, an ac-
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the plaintiffs' expert witnesses are vulnerable to the defendants'
challenge if admitted, 150 and the court acknowledged that it has no
expertise in analyzing the data and opinions from the plaintiffs'
experts. 151
Therefore, even if the plaintiffs were residents of a uranium
and vanadium milling town, 152 which had been ranked by the
Environmental Protection Agency to prioritize remedial action as
the nation's most environmentally hazardous sites, 153 and at least
some of the plaintiffs or decedents had developed diseases, 154 their
claims for personal injury could not survive summary judgment. 155
For plaintiffs who had not developed any disease, their claims for
medical monitoring were not compensable because they failed to
meet the threshold requirement of bodily injury under the PAA. 156
The court reasoned that subclinical injuries, such as DNA damage
and cell death, creates only a possibility of clinical disease and does
not constitute bodily injury under the PAA, regardless ofcertain state
courts' recognition of medical-monitoring claims absent clinical
symptoms. 157
The June court raised public policy considerations to justify
its denial of relief for plaintiffs who have not developed diseases. 158
As the court has stated, public policy dictates "denying relief to those
without symptomatic, diagnosed ailments so that scarce resources
can be directed to compensate those who have suffered more serious

tor's conduct can be deemed causal where it is of sufficient significance in pro
ducing the harm as to lead reasonable persons to regard it as a cause and to attach
responsibility. Id.
150 Id at 1247 n.7.
151 Id at 1246--47.
152 Id at 1236.
153 Id at 1237.
154 0fthe twenty-seven personal-injury plaintiffs, eleven had been diagnosed with
non-thyroid cancer and sixteen had been diagnosed with thyroid disease, includ
ing one case of thyroid cancer. Id.
155 Id at 1236.
156 Id at 1248.
157 Id at 1249.
158 Id at 1251.
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harms." 159 These public policy considerations are simply misguided
because plaintiffs, even those who have suffered serious harms,
would eventually fail on causation issues and be left remediless.
Similarly, in Phillips v. E. I Dupont De Nemours & Co., 160
the Ninth Circuit rejected a more lenient "substantial factor test" and
insisted on finding but-for cause. 161 As a result, even though the court
found that plutonium production at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons
Reservation was an abnormally dangerous activity warranting strict
liability and thereby limited the issues to causation and damages, 162
the residents living in the surrounding area of Hanford Reservation
were unable to prove that the amount of radiation to which each
plaintiff was exposed was sufficient to be the factual cause of his or
her thyroid disease. 163
Though the Philips court rejected medical-monitoring claims
under the PAA, 164 the jury in the lower court found in favor of two
plaintiffs who had developed thyroid cancer. 165 Nevertheless, the
Philips court was skeptical about "government bias" in revealing
the Hanford Environment Dose Reconstruction Project, 166 which
released a report disclosing that a large quantity of radioactive
substances had been emitted from the Hanford Reservation into the
surrounding area, 167 and the plaintiffs' stipulation to the accuracy of
the document prior to trial. 168
Contrary to the stagnation in court, administrative
compensation schemes have developed and adopted probability of
causation to estimate the probability or likelihood that the illness of
an individual member of a certain group was caused by exposure
!d.
534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008).
161 Id at 996, 1010-11.
162 Id at 998, 1005.
163 Id at 998-99, 1013-14.
164 Id at 1010.
165 Id at 998-99.
166 Id at 1014.
167 Id at 997. The U.S. Department of Energy created the project in 1987. In 1990,
a report entitled Initial Hanford Radiation Dose Estimates was released. The
disclosure sparked a blaze oflitigation. !d.
168 Id at 1014.
159
160
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to a particular hazard. 169 For instance, an energy employee is
eligible for compensation for a specified cancer under the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of
2000 ("EEOICPA")l 70 if the Department of Labor determines that
the cancer was "at least as likely as not," a fifty percent or greater
probability, caused by radiation doses incurred in the performance
of duty. 171
However, employing the probability of causation to
determine whether a claimant should be compensated may lead to
an unintended result. As James Robins has pointed out, companies
would have the incentive to replace workers just before their
cumulative exposure was large enough for the probability of
causation to exceed the mandated cutoff point. 172 Nevertheless, the
unintended result can be avoided if the compensation awarded is in
proportion to the probability of causation regardless of whether the
particular claimant's probability of causation is higher or lower than
fifty percent.
In fact, what commentators were really opposed to is
arbitrarily setting a cutoff point, or a bright-line, such as a relative
risk173 exceeding 2.0. 174 Though it might be imprecise or even
169 Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy
Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Act of2000, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,296,
22,297 (May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 81).
170 42 U.S.C. § 7384-85 (2011).
171 Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy
Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Act of2000, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,296,
22,296 (May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 81).
172 James Robins, Science for Judge II: the Practice of Epidemiology and
Administrative Agency Created Science: Should Compensation Schemes be Based
on the Probability ofCausation or Expected Years ofLife Lost?, 12 J. L. & PoL'Y
537, 544 (2004).
173 Relative risk or rate ratio is calculated from epidemiologic data comparing the
disease rate in a cohort of individuals exposed to the hazard to that in an unex
posed cohort. Robins, supra note 172, at 538.
174 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 4, at 569-70; Steven N. Goodman, Science for
Judges VII: Evaluating Evidence ofCausation & Forensic Laboratories: Current
Issues & Standards: Judgment for Judges: What Traditional Statistics Don t Tell
You About Causal Claims, 15 J. L. & PoL'Y 93, 102---04 (2007); David W. Barnes,
Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence ofTort Causation, 64 L. & CoNTEMP.
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erroneous, some experts in court have equated a relative risk of two
to a fifty percent probability of causation. 175 Apparently, the main
justification for setting a cutoff point at fifty percent is not science but
the legal concept, "more likely than not." 176 As Bernard D. Goldstein
has argued, a strictly applied bright-line rule is inappropriate because
the determination of relative risk in an epidemiological study is far
from precise. 177 Consequently, it would affect the probability of
causation, which is calculated based on the relative risk.
As an alternative to the probability ofcausation, commentators
have suggested that compensation awarded should be in proportion
to the claimants' expected years of life lost, 178 or quality-years of
life lost. 179 As commentators have argued, a just compensation
scheme should be sensitive to incidence time, such as awarding
damages in proportion to years of life lost, while the probability
of causation is insensitive to the impact of exposure on disease
timing. 180 In addition, "a payment scheme with awards proportional
to the probability of causation is sensitive to both misspecification
of exposure interaction with other risk factors and heterogeneity of
the background rates." 181
PRoBs. 191, 205---07 (2001). "The law appears willing to accept no more than

a forty-nine percent chance of error while science appears willing to accept no
more than a five percent chance of error. This perception is incorrect, but hard to
change." !d. at 191.
175 Sander Greenland, Relation ofProbability of Causation to Relative Risk and
Doubling Dose: a Methodologic Error that has Become a Social Problem, Am. J.
Pub. Health 89(8): 1166, 1166--67 (1999).
176 See, e.g., Robins, supra note 172, at 537; Guidelines for Determining the
Probability of Causation Under the Energy Employee Occupational Illness
Compensation Act of 2000, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,296, 22,296 (May 2, 2002) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 81).
177 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 570.
178 See, e.g., Robins, supra note 172, at 537; Sander Greenland & James M.
Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability ofCausation, 40 JURIMETRICS
321, 323 (2000).
179 Robins, supra note 172, at 537.
180 Greenland & Robins, supra note 178, at 323.
181 James Robins & Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation Under
a Stochastic Model for Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRICS 1125, 1131 (1989).
Unmeasured genetic and environmental factors may lead to large between-subject
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It is true that the probability of causation has limitations.
James Robins argued that awarding compensation in proportion to
the probability of causation raises a serious problem with fairness:
under such a payment scheme, the estate of a young man and of an
old man would be equally compensated for the same probability
of causation, even if the young man has suffered a greater loss. 182
Nevertheless, awarding payment in proportion to expected years of
life lost raises serious problem with unfairness as well. Specifically,
defendants may be charged with a huge liability disproportional to
their culpability and be driven out of the nuclear industry, which is
what the PAA sought to prevent.
Moreover, at present the probability of causation is used in
determining causation, rather than the amount of damages. Without
first establishing causation, there is no issue of compensation.
Therefore, this article argues that the award of damages,
either in court or under an administrative compensation scheme,
should be in proportion to the defendants' culpability. When the
substance for the rule of causation changes, such as the adoption
of the probability of causation, the rule for damages should change
as well. Otherwise, the scale would tip in favor of the plaintiffs
against the defendants. This is especially true when plaintiffs cannot
exclude other probable causes for their injury and have to rely on the
probability of causation to infer a causallinl<:.
A legal decision cannot wait for a complex scientific issue to
become clarified. 183 It is a policy choice between awarding a large
sum of compensation to fewer claimants but wrongly excluding
claimants who should have been eligible for the compensation,
and awarding less compensation to more claimants by eliminating
an arbitrary cutoff point for eligibility. In light of the inherently
imprecise nature 184 of the probability of causation and relative risk,
the article suggests choosing the latter.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part II, dose reconstructions
in radiation-exposure class litigations where the claimants are
heterogeneity in background hazards. !d. at 1126.
182 Robins, supra note 172, at 544--45.
183 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 571.
184 See Kennedy v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 268 F.3d at 771 (2001).
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residents rather than workers at the nuclear plant, are much more
complicated and difficult to estimate reliably enough to convince
the court. Alternatively, claimants were compelled to explore other
causes of action, such as the infliction of mental distress.

III.

REMEDY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH

As the President's Commission on the Accident at Three
Mile Island has acknowledged, the most serious health effect of
the accident was severe mental stress, especially for families with
preschool children, although the Commission believed that the
mental stress was short lived. 185 The knowledge of unnecessary and
excessive radiation exposure, in and of itself, may cause mental
anguish. 186 It is especially so when there is deception or concealment
about the exposure involved, such as in the Taiwanese case, Wang
Yu-Lin, and an American case, Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp. 187
Alleging physical harm in the absence of manifestation of diseas
es, as seen in Wang Yu-Lin, 188 is usually insufficient for a court to
find damages. Though the Taiwanese court was reluctant to find the
existence of physical harm in this case, it did in some way relax
the requirement for finding mental anguish and grant damages to
the residents. Specifically, the court answered the question whether
AEC's inaction is the direct cause ofthe residents' mental anguish. 189
The court reasoned that, though the residents had not
shown cancerous effects or other genetic effects, the "factors" that
would cause abnormality in health had been inside the residents'
body because of their long-term excessive exposure to radiation,
as demonstrated by the results of clinical tests. 190 The abnormality
185 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR
CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 13 (1979).
186 See Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2005). One of
the lead plaintiffs in this case testified that his main fear was not present injury, but
that he was "worried to death" what the radiation was doing to him. !d.
187 402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005).
188 Wang Yu-Lin et al. v. AEC, 2002 87-chong-shang-kuo-tze-1 at 49 (Civ. Judg
ment ofTaiwanApp. Ct., Jan. 30, 2002).
189
190

!d.
!d. at 74. Laboratory studies suggested that the residents' physical health may
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in health would eventually emerge, after a latency period whose
duration varies. 191 Therefore, it cannot be said that the residents'
health was not harmed simply because there was no manifestation
of symptoms. 192 Compared to ordinary people, "factors" that would
affect the residents' health were already inside their body. 193
Nevertheless, it appeared that the court's granting of
damages was predominantly based on the finding of mental anguish
the residents suffered, rather than the physical harm to the residents'
body. The court's reasoning continued that because the residents have
higher incident rates of cancers, as well as blood-cell abnormality,
genetic damage, and higher chance of incurring other diseases than
the ordinary population, it has become a heavy psychological burden
for the residents. 194 Therefore, it is evident that the residents' mental
health was harmed. 195
On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Rainer were not so
lucky. The plaintiffs in Rainer were current and former workers
at a uranium-enrichment plant and their family members. 196 The
workers were exposed over many years to dangerous radioactive
substances without their knowledge, but were not yet suffering
from any symptoms of a clinical disease at the time they filed the
lawsuit. 197 Company documents also revealed that the management
hesitated to have workers' health examined because of the union's
alleged use ofthis as an excuse for hazard pay. 198 Moreover, workers

have been affected by the exposure to radiation including the significant increases
in chromosomal aberration frequencies. The residents' ratio of thyroid gland
enlargement was four times higher than the reference group, and the ratio of T
lymphocyte function abnormality was two times higher. Id at 68. In addition, two
out of nine newborns born in the radioactive contaminated building had congeni
tal heart diseases. The ratio is 22.2%, which is higher than 0.8%, the ratio among
normal populations. Id at 67.
191 Id at 74.
192Jd.

Id.
Id at 75.
195 !d.
196 Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d at 611, 613-14.
197 Id. at 611.
198 Id. at 612.
193

194
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at the plant were not required to wash their hands and not required to
use respirators until the late 1970s. 199
In the workers' situation, as a lead plaintiff testified in Rainer,
what made them worried to death was not present injury but what the
radiation was doing to them, 200 especially in light of the company's
concealment. 201 Similar to the plaintiffs in Wang Yu-Lin, laboratory
tests showed a significantly higher ratio of structural chromosome
abnormalities within the workers' cells in Rainer. 202 Nevertheless,
contrary to the Taiwanese court in Wang Yu-Lin, the Rainer court
reasoned that the plaintiffs' "DNA damage is harmful only insofar
as it is predictive of future harm" and the injuries claimed "have
caused no financial losses or impairments."203 The court dismissed
workers' claims as "premature."204
It is worth noting that the fear of developing cancer and the
increased risk of cancer are compensable outside the PAA context.
For instance, the Fifth Circuit in Smith v. A. C. & S., Inc. 205 opined
that a plaintiff seeking recovery for fear of cancer is compensable
if he can present evidence of his specific fear of the condition as
a threshold matter, 206 rather than a general statement that he is
concerned about his health, 207 and if the jury finds that the plaintiff's
fear of cancer is both reasonable and serious. 208 A plaintiff can
recover for the increased risk of cancer if he can prove that his toxic
exposure will more probably than not lead to cancer. 209 The U.S.
Supreme Court in Norfolk & Western Railway. v. Ayers210 took a
!d.
See id. at 613.
201 See id. at 611-12.
202 !d. at 613.
203 !d. at 622.
204 !d.
205 Smith v.A.C. & S., Inc., 843 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff was a former
industrial sheet metal worker who sustained extensive exposure to asbestos dust.
!d. at 855.
206 !d.
207 Id at 859.
208 !d.
209 !d. at 859 n.3.
210 Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
199

200
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step back from Smith and held that a plaintiff can recover damages
for fear of cancer without proof of physical manifestations only if
the plaintiff has asbestosis and he can prove that the fear is genuine
and serious, but the opinion is limited to claims brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. 211
Unlike asbestosis, exposure to low-dose radiation does not
leave an identifiable marker in the victim's body before cancer can
be detected. 212 The lack of an identifiable marker adds difficulty to
the award of damages for mental anguish in the radiation-exposure
context. The district court in Berg v. E.I Dupont De Nemours &
Co. 213 sought to devise a bright-line test and held that plaintiffs who
were not ill could proceed with their emotional-distress claims if
they can prove that the median of the probability-of-causation
estimates exceeds fifty percent. 214 However, on appeal, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that allowing purely emotional-distress claims
would be inconsistent with the PAA's "bodily injury" requirement;
although Washington state law permits such claims in the absence
of physical injury. 215 Therefore, in essence, the PAA has deprived
victims of damages for mental anguish available under certain state
law.
The discrepancy between the PAA and state law has
generated a legal fiction that plaintiffs, who were exposed to
materials possessing both radioactive and nonradioactive properties,
can recover damages for mental anguish caused by the exposure
to the non-radioactive property but not the radioactive property of
the same material. For instance, in Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford
Group, Inc., 216 the plaintiff was exposed to toxic liquid containing

211 !d. at 157. Asbestosis is a noncancerous scarring of the lungs by asbestos fibers.
It is a chronic disease that is fatal only in rare instances. !d. at 142 n.2.
212 See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 643.
213 Berg v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. (In re Berg Litig.), 293 F.3d 1127 (9th
Cir. 2002).
214 !d. at 1129, 1131. "The [fifty percent] level corresponds to a probability that an
individual has a disease caused by radiation that is twice the probability of such
disease in the population as a whole." !d. at 1129.
215 !d. at 1131.
216 Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc., 528 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2008).
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radioactive materials and nonradioactive heavy metals. 217 The Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiff cannot recover for psychic harm
without proving that the exposure to radioactive materials caused
his physical injuries. 218 However, ifthe plaintiff can show emotional
distress arising out of separately identifiable fears from heavy metal,
rather than a general fear for his future health intertwined with his
exposure to radioactive materials, his claim for such damages would
not be preempted by the PAA. 219
As the Rainer court has pointed out, an important reason
that courts are reluctant to grant damages for fear of cancer or
damages for enhanced risk of developing a dreaded disease in the
future is because courts do not know how the damages should be
calculated. 220 Indeed, losses resulting from salient physical diseases
such as cancer or asbestosis are at least quantifiable, and courts are
familiar with methods of computing costs associated with medical
care, absence from work, and physical pain, but not purely mental
distress. 221
However, medical monitoring, as a form of recovery rather
than a cause of action, may well serve the purpose of alleviating
mental anguish caused by the fear of developing cancer or the
increased risk of cancer. As Jamie A. Grodsky has suggested, instead
of lump sum payment, medical-monitoring relief can be confined
to reimbursement for specific diagnostic tests ordered by medical
professionals. 222 Through regular checkups, plaintiffs not only
know when an individual's condition is progressive, but when an
individual's condition is static or self-reparable. 223 The latter should
be permitted to withdraw from the plaintiff class or to discontinue
the monitoring regime. 224

Id at 682.
!d. at 683-84.
219 !d. at 684.
220 Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d at 622.
221 !d.
222 Grodsky, supra note 122, at 1715-16. The expenses can be deducted from a
court-approved fund only as they are incurred. !d. at 1715.
223 !d. at 1717.
224 !d.
217
218
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Nevertheless, Jamie A. Grodsky did not exclude the possibility
that we may "need to consider complementary administrative or
regulatory strategies to help strike the balance between deterrence
and legal restraint" if the concerns of either "unbridled liability"
or "risks without remedies" proved to be true. 225 Taiwan adopted
an administrative compensation scheme in redressing the property
injury caused by radioactive-steel contamination. However, the
compensation scheme apparently has neglected residents who are
not property owners.
IV. REMEDY FOR PROPERTY INJURY

As Eric R. Pogue has stated, the real toll of a nuclear accident
takes the form of property damage. 226 The statement remains true
when radiation contamination is caused by sources other than a
nuclear accident, such as buildings contaminated with radioactive
steel. Taiwan established a compensation scheme to redress the
economic loss arising from buildings contaminated with radioactive
steel after the government found that Ming-Sheng Villa was not a
special case, but the tip of an iceberg.
The AEC in Taiwan issued the Regulations for Prevention
and Handling of Radiation Contaminated Buildings ("RPHRCB")
in 1994. The scheme grants compensation predominantly based
on the value of the property at issue, and is less concerned with
the residents' health. The only provisions concerning the residents'
health under the regulations are that residents exposed to radiation
in excess offive mSv in any particular year are provided with a free
medical checkup in the same year. 227

!d. at 1733.
Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model ofRisk Regulation and the Regulatory
Legacy of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 463,
470 (2007).
227 Regulation for Preventive Measures and Management Plans for the Incident
of Radioactivity Contaminated Buildings, ch. 3, art. 9, AEC-083-01-202 (1994).
Though the regulations provides that the Department of Health may continue to
monitor the residents' health if the medical examination shows signs of injury
caused by the exposure, the government is not obliged to do so. !d.
225

226
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Under the RPHRCB, property owners have two options: first,
they may sell the properties to the authorized agency at a reasonable
price if the radiation doses detected are in excess of fifteen mSv
per year, and the agency has the discretion to decide whether the
buildings should be demolished after the transfer of ownership to
the agency; 228 or second, the owners of the contaminated buildings
may receive a one-time payment at the amount of five percent of
the property's reasonable value, if the radiation doses detected are
in excess of fifteen mSv per year and the property owner chooses
to maintain his ownership. 229 However, in no situation should the
payment be in excess of 500,000 N.T.D. (New Taiwan Dollar), or
less than 200,000 N.T.D. 230
For owners of buildings where the radiation doses detected
are in excess of five but less than fifteen mSv per year, they do not
have the option selling the buildings to the agency, but they are
eligible for a one-time payment in the amount of200,000 N.T.D. 231 If
owners of contaminated buildings wish to reconstruct the buildings
at their own expenses, the agency should reimburse half of the
expenses actually incurred. 232 Nevertheless, in no situation should
the reimbursement exceed 500,000 N.T.D. if the radiation doses
detected are in excess of fifteen mSv per year; or 400,000 N.T.D.
ifthe radiation doses are in excess of five but less than fifteen mSv
per year. 233
The compensation provided under the Taiwanese scheme
is based on the monetary value of the buildings, rather than the
diagnosis of listed diseases the residents have suffered. Therefore,
there is a possibility that residents who contracted the most severe
diseases may be granted compensation in an amount less than other
residents because the buildings they owned are worth less than
Regulation for Preventive Measures and Management Plans for the Incident
of Radioactivity Contaminated Buildings, ch. 3, art. 10 AEC-083-01-202 (1994).
229 Regulation for Preventive Measures and Management Plans for the Incident of
Radioactivity Contaminated Buildings, ch. 3, art. ll,AEC-083-01-202 (1994).
230 !d.
231 !d.
232 Regulation for Preventive Measures and Management Plans for the Incident of
Radioactivity Contaminated Buildings, ch. 3, art. 12,AEC-083-01-202 (1994).
233 !d.
228
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others'. It is even worse if the residents are not the owners of any
building, such as lessees. In such a situation, lessees are only eligible
for a free medical checkup if they are exposed to radiation doses
exceeding the threshold level. Other than that, they are not eligible
for any monetary compensation or medical monitoring under the
scheme, even if they have suffered some of the most severe adverse
health effects.
Contrary to the RPHRCB's approach focusing on the value
of properties at issue rather than the increased risk to the residents'
health, courts in the U.S. continued to tie plaintiffs' property tort
claims closely to the estimates of increased risk to health caused by
radiation exposure. For instance, in Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
234 the court suggested that the plaintiffs may pursue the claims for
loss of use of their properties under the PAA. 235 However, whether
plaintiffs can prevail in such claims remains dependent on whether
they can reliably estimate the particular risk to the residents' health. 236
In January 1990, the owners of property near the Rocky Flats Weap
ons Plant ("Rocky Flats") filed a class action suit alleging the release
of plutonium particles at Rocky Flats resulted in the contamination
of the class members' properties. 237 The suit is a public liability ac
tion under the PAA involving trespass and nuisance claims. 238 The
plaintiffs sought compensatory damages measured by the diminu
tion of property values and punitive damages. 239
At trial, the plaintiffs' expert testimony indicated that
plutonium exposure, no matter how small, increases the risk of

618 F.3d 1127 (lOth Cir. 2010).
!d. at 1141--42.
236 !d. at 1142.
237 !d. at 1131. The Rocky Flats Weapons Plant manufactured components for the
United States' nuclear weapons program from 1952 to 1989. !d. The U.S. govern
ment contracted with Dow Chemical Company to operate the facility from 1952
to 1975 and then with Rockwell International Corporation. !d. In June 1989, the
operations at Rocky Flats ceased after the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Environmental Protection Agency searched the facility. !d. Rockwell was charged
with and later pleaded guilty to certain environmental crimes at the site. !d.
238 !d.
239 !d.
234
235
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cancer. 240 Despite the expert's acknowledgment that the increased
risk is small and unquantifiable, 241 the jury found in favor of the
plaintiff class on both the trespass and nuisance claims. 242 Later,
the defendants appealed the district court's judgment and the class
members filed a cross-appeal. 243
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit relied on its reasoning earlier
in June, which is a case involving the increased risk of developing
radiation-related illness in the absence of bodily injury,244 and
concluded that, by analogy, neither the mere presence of radioactive
source on the plaintiffs' properties245 nor the diminution of the
plaintiffs' property values is sufficient to establish actual damage to
property under the PAA. 246 In Cook, the plaintiffs did not argue any
claim involving bodily injury. Instead, they pursued classic property
tort claims, trespass, 247 and nuisance, to seek recovery for injuries
to a property interest. 248 Nevertheless, analogous to June, the court
in Cook held that an existing physical injury to property at the time
the PAA claim is asserted is necessary to establish "damage to
property" under 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). 249 Neither the mere presence
!d. at 1134.
!d.
242 !d. The litigation continued for over 15 years. Eventually, in June 2008, the
district court entered a judgment for over $926 million to the plaintiff class. !d.
at 1133-34.
243 !d. at 1134.
244 June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d at 1237, 1248--49.
245 Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 618 F.3d at 1141.
246 !d. at 1141 n. 12.
247 !d. at 1148--49. The court recognized that radioactive particles have mass and
are physically present on the land, but the particles are impalpable, therefore the
trespass alleged must be tried as an intangible trespass. !d. As to the intangible
trespass claims, the Cook court concluded that the plaintiffs need to prove actual
physical damage to their properties to prevail. !d. The court first reasoned that the
deposit of radioactive materials is impalpable therefore the intangible trespass
theory, rather than the traditional trespass theory, should apply in this context.
!d. The court held that the district court erred in failing to require the plaintiff to
prove that the intrusion of radioactive materials caused physical damage to their
properties. !d.
248 !d. at 1140 n. 11.
249 !d. at 1140.
240
241
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of radioactive source on the plaintiffs' property250 nor the diminution
of the plaintiffs' property values is sufficient to establish actual
damage. 251
In essence, the Cook court was declaring that virtually no
radiation contamination would meet the requirement of "damage to
property" under the PAA. Regardless of the extent and dosage of
radiation contamination, even in the most severe cases, the mere
presence of radioactive source on the plaintiffs' property is not
sufficient to sustain a public liability action under 42 U.S.C. § 2014
(q). It is highly doubtful Congress intended to create a damage
list where virtually no damage would be sufficient, no matter how
severe the contamination.
However, the court noted that damage to property is not the
only property injury that a plaintiff can prove to establish a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (q). 252 Aplaintiffmay claim a "loss ofuse
of property instead."253 The Cook court suggested that "more than a
mere interference with an owner's use is necessary" and "a particular
use of the property must actually be lost." 254
For a plaintiff to prevail in a nuisance claim, the interference
must be both "substantial" and "unreasonable."255 The Cook court
agreed that the presence ofradioactive contamination that creates an
actual risk to health may interfere with a plaintiff's use or enjoyment
ofland. 256 The plaintiffs' anxiety from an increased risk to their health
may constitute unreasonable and substantial interference with their
use and enjoyment of their property only if the anxiety is arising
from "scientifically verifiable evidence regarding the risk."257
The court in Cook suggested that the plaintiffs could have
presented evidence sufficient to establish a loss of use, 258 but they
!d. at 1141.
Id. at 1141 n. 12. Diminution of value is traditionally utilized "as a measure
ment of damages rather than proof of the fact to damage." !d.
252 !d. at 1141.
253 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (q) (2011).
254 Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 618 F.3d at 1141.
255 !d. at 1145.
256 !d.
257 Id.
258 !d. at 1141--42.
250
251
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did not. 259 The court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument and stated
"when the presence of radioactive materials creates a sufficiently
high risk to health, a loss of use may in fact occur."260 Nevertheless,
the plaintiffs must estimate or calculate "the particular level of risk"
created by the defendants' conduct. 261 A scientifically unfounded
risk can never be unreasonable and substantial interference. 262
Similarly, a mere statement that "any exposure to plutonium
whatsoever increases the risk of health problems to some degree"
is not enough. 263
Though it may be coincident, after analysis this article
found that both the Taiwanese administrative compensation scheme
and the U.S. federal courts relatively favor finding the claimants'
property injury, as opposed to adverse effect to health. For instance,
the compensation scheme in Taiwan awards payment basically in
proportion to the value of the claimants' property. For residents
without property ownership, including the lessee, the only benefit
mandated under the scheme is a medical examination free of charge.
As to the U.S. federal courts, a line of cases have found that
the plaintiffs' increased risk of developing cancer or other dreaded
diseases, in and of itself, is insufficient to claim bodily injury or
mental anguish under the PAA. However, as noted in Cook, the court
suggested that a sufficiently high risk to health may have constituted
a loss of use of the property under the PAA. 264 As a result, similar
to the Taiwanese approach, only property owners may reasonably
expect recovery from excessive exposure to radiation.
The social injustice caused by systemic bias in favor of
property owners is evident under the Taiwanese administrative
compensation scheme and the U.S. federal courts' interpretation of
the PAA. Residents without property ownership, such as the lessee
or the poor, are essentially remediless. The systemic bias needs to
be redressed.
!d.
!d.
261 !d.
262 !d.
263 !d.
264 !d.
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260
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CONCLUSION

Courts frequently raise public policy considerations to justify
the denial of relief for plaintiffs who have not developed diseases
after exposure to excessive radiation. For instance, one court decided
to "deny relief to those without symptomatic, diagnosed ailments so
that scarce resources can be directed to compensate those who have
suffered more serious harms." 265 Nevertheless, the public policy
considerations are simply misguided because plaintiffs, even those
who have suffered serious bodily injury, would eventually fail on
causation issues and be left remediless.
The Taiwanese administrative compensation scheme and
U.S. federal courts' interpretation of the PAA both favor finding
property injury to claimants, as opposed to adverse effects to their
health. For the latter, the increased risk of developing cancer is
never sufficient to establish bodily injury or mental anguish under
the PAA. Nonetheless, it may be sufficient in proving the loss of use
of property. Residents without property ownership, such as lessees
or the poor, are virtually remediless. The social injustice caused by
unintended systemic bias should be redressed.
However, the award of compensation, either in court
or under an administrative compensation scheme, should be in
proportion to the defendants' culpability, as opposed to solely based
on the claimant's loss. Otherwise, the scale would tip in favor of the
plaintiffs against the defendants. It is especially so in situations where
the plaintiffs cannot exclude other probable causes of their injury
and have to rely on the probability of causation to infer causal link.
One example is awarding payment in proportion to the probability
of causation and at the same time eliminating the arbitrary cutoff
point to avoid excluding claimants who should have been eligible
for compensation. For claimants who have not developed diseases,
medical monitoring, as a form of recovery rather than a cause of
action, may well serve the purpose of alleviating mental anguish
caused by the fear of developing cancer or the increased risk of
cancer.

265
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